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Abstract 
 
There has been a long-lasting debate in the literature regarding the effect of globalisation on 
welfare state spending. Whereas some argue that globalisation and welfare state spending are 
in tension, others emphasize the positive relation between globalisation and welfare state 
spending. However, both arguments neglect the political conflict that underlies the relationship 
between globalisation and welfare state spending. Additionally, most studies focus on welfare 
state spending at an aggregated level. Consequently, they overlook the diverging impact of 
globalisation across individual welfare programmes. This study aims to fill this gap in the 
literature by analysing the effect of globalisation on eight individual welfare programmes in 
fourteen OECD countries. This study’s main theoretical contribution is the argument that the 
institutional structure of welfare programmes that are associated with both firm demands from 
the (potential) losers of globalisation and strong opposition from capital owners, mediates the 
relationship between globalisation and expenditure levels. To empirically test this claim, this 
study uses LIS data to create concentration indices. This enables this study to test its argument 
that targeting welfare state spending towards low-income groups results in globalisation-
induced retrenchment. This study’s results, obtained with pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regression analysis, provide some support that this is indeed the case. 
 
Key words: Aggregated Welfare State Spending, Globalisation, Targeting, and Concentration 
Indices.  
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1 Introduction  
There has been a long-lasting debate in the welfare state literature regarding the effect of 
globalisation on welfare state spending. On the one hand, there are scholars who argue that 
increased competition in goods and services that is associated with globalisation is incompatible 
with generous welfare state (Garrett 2001; Burgoon 2001; Swank 2005; Genschel 2011). 
Consequently, globalisation will result in welfare state retrenchment. This argument, known as 
the efficiency hypothesis, focusses on the structural dependence of governments on capital 
owners and combines this logic with the increased mobility of firms and capital in the area of 
globalisation. The latter enables capital owners to avoid taxes by moving towards low- tax 
countries. Since governments are dependent on capital owners’ investments for economic 
growth, and re-election, the increased mobility of firms and capital creates a prisoner’s dilemma 
in which governments cut welfare spending and lower taxes in order to attract investment. This 
will potentially result in a race-to-the-bottom that hollows out the welfare state.  
In sharp contrast to the above, scholars like Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998) argue 
that globalisation will result in welfare state expansion. In the argumentation underlying their 
so-called compensation hypothesis, they focus on the demand-side of welfare state spending, 
arguing that governments will increase welfare state spending to meet compensation demand 
of those who experience globalisation-induced economic insecurity. Thereby, they rely on 
models like the Richard-Viner and the Stopler-Samuelson to explain the distributive effects of 
globalisation (Samuelson and Stopler 1941; Samuelson 1971). Recent studies focussing on the 
micro foundations of the compensation hypothesis, indeed indicate that globalisation increased 
economic insecurity among low-educated individuals resulting in demands for compensation 
in the form of welfare state spending (Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Walter 2010, 2017).  
Third, there is a stream in the literature that argues that globalisation and welfare state 
spending are unrelated (Kittel and Winner 2005), or at least mediated by political and 
institutional conditions (Rothstein 1998; Hall and Soskice 2001; Swank 2002; Korpi and Palme 
2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004). The argumentation of scholars focussing on the latter is 
founded in Pierson’s (1996, 2001) new politics argument. Swank (2002) was the first to extent 
this logic to the case of globalisation by arguing that the effect of globalisation in conditioned 
on the institutional structure of a welfare state. Whereas welfare states characterized as 
universal are able to resist globalisation-induced pressures for retrenchment, the odds of liberal 
welfare state to withstand these pressures are less favourable. Scholar like Kopri (2003), Allan  
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and Scruggs (2004) and Kwon and Ponstusson (2005) present a slightly different, yet related 
argument by arguing that class and partisan politics determine whether globalisation results in 
welfare state expansion or retrenchment.  
It has been argued that these contradicting findings can be explained by the fact that the 
lion’s share of these studies analyse welfare state spending at an aggregated level (Schulze and 
Ursprung 1999; Burgoon 2001; Dreher et al. 2007). This presumption is supported by the results 
of recent studies that analyse welfare state spending at a disaggregated level. Examples in this 
regard are Moene and Wallerstein (2003), who studied effect of earning inequality on individual 
welfare programmes, Mahler and Jesuit (2006) and Wang et al. (2014) who disaggregated 
welfare state spending to analyse the effect of fiscal redistribution, and Castles (2009) and 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx (2011), who examined potential determinants of the structure 
of welfare state spending.  
This study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of globalisation on 
welfare state spending at a disaggregated level. Thereby, it argues that the effect of globalisation 
indeed differs across welfare programmes. In this respect, this study builds further on 
Burgoon’s (2001) argumentation. On the one hand, it is assumed that the (potential) losers of 
globalisation specifically demand increased spending on welfare programmes that directly 
answer to their short-term needs. Programmes that do not meet these criteria are perceived as 
less relevant, and consequently are less demanded. Capital owners, on the other hand, are 
expected to oppose programmes that increase tax burdens, do not improve productivity, or both. 
By combing these preferences, this study defines four ideal-type categories of welfare state 
programmes: stable programmes, eroding programmes, expanding programmes and erratic 
programmes.  
Thereby, this study contributes to the literature which analyses the relationship between 
globalisation and welfare state spending from either an efficiency or a compensation 
perspective. These studies in this regard tend to oversimplify the politics linking both 
phenomena. The oversimplification related to these studies is at best rooted in the lack of 
explicit hypotheses regarding the key political actors (globalisation’s (potential) losers, capital 
owners and governments) in the political conflict underlying globalisation. At worse, these 
studies incorrectly assume that the preferences of their main actors, either the (potential) losers 
or the capital (owners), are uniform across programmes. Consequently, the high-qualitive 
empirical evidence that is provided by these studies misses important details about the nature 
of the globalisation, welfare state spending, and the politics underlying them.  
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 Although this study is indebted to the work of Burgoon (2001), it also updates his work 
both form a theoretically and methodological point of view. First, Burgoon (2001) is unclear 
how globalisation impacts welfare programmes are associated with both heavy demands from 
the (potential) losers of globalisation and strong opposition from capital owners. This study 
argues that the effect of globalisation on spending on these erratic programmes is mediated by 
the programme’s institutional structure.  
 This argument has its foundations in the work of Korpi and Palme (1998). They 
theorized that there is a paradox of redistribution based on their finding that welfare 
programmes that are targeted towards the are associated with less government spending. 
Consequently, they argue that “the more we target benefits to the poor […], the less likely we 
are to reduce poverty and inequality” (1998, 681-2). Rothstein (1998), Swank (2004) and 
Lindblom and Rothstein (2014), presented a similar argument based on the institutional 
structure of the welfare state in its totality. Yet, whereas they focus on the welfare state a whole, 
this study focusses on welfare state programmes. 
This study’s main argument is that erratic welfare programmes that are targeted towards 
low-income groups are relatively receptive to retrenchment demands from capital owners. This 
receptiveness towards retrenchment demands is rooted in the small and isolated electoral base 
associated with targeted programmes. Consequently, the electoral costs for governments to 
answer to the call of capital owners to reduce welfare state spending is relatively low. 
Opposingly, erratic programmes that are characterized as universal are supported by a 
substantial larger share of the electorate. Consequently, the electoral costs of retrenchment are 
relatively high, making this an unlikely scenario.  
 The above presented argumentation regarding a welfare programme’s institutional 
structure is the main focus of this study. This focus can be translated into the following research 
question: 
  
Does a welfare programmes’ institutional structure, classified as rather targeted 
towards low-income groups or universal, mediates the impact of globalisation 
on welfare programmes that are associated with political conflict? 
 
To answer this question this study used pooled time-series cross-sectional regression analyses 
to obtain the desired results for fourteen OECD countries in the period from 1994 to 2012. 
Thereby, it relies on the most recent data available updating the work of Korpi and Palme (1998) 
Burgoon (2001) and Swank (2002). Additionally, this study contributes to the literature by 
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using LIS data (2017) to calculate concentration indices for an individual programme. In this 
respect, it updates the work of Jesuit and Mahler (2006) and Wang and Caminada (2011, 2017).  
The remainder of this study is organized in the following way. First, this study conducts 
a literature review discussing the presumed effect of globalisation and welfares state spending. 
Thereafter, the main argument is presented regarding the institutional characteristics of welfare 
state programs, and testable hypotheses are defined. Thereafter, the data, measures and method 
used in this study are described. Lastly, the results of this study are presented and discussed.  
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2 Literature Review: Globalisation and Welfare State Spending 
 
2.1 The efficiency hypothesis 
 
The first perspective, the so-called efficiency hypothesis, argues that globalisation and the 
associated increased competition in goods and services is incompatible with generous social 
welfare state provisions. This logic is based on the so-called ‘structural dependence thesis’ 
(Swank 2001). This thesis states that governments are dependent on the willingness of firms 
and capital owners to invest. There are three underlying assumptions supporting this statement. 
 First, this thesis assumes that societies are dependent on capital owners (Lindblom 1997; 
Prezeworski and Wallerstein 1988; Swank 1992). Capital owners decide over the allocation of 
resources and the investment in productive activities. Yet, these private decisions also have 
public consequences. They have an effect on future production, employment, and consumption. 
In most countries, governments can hardly steer these decisions given the constitutional rules 
like laws on private property. Consequently, societies are dependent on the willingness of 
capital owners to invest for economic prosperity. Thus, as Lindblom puts it, capital owners have 
“(…) jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and the economic security of all 
the rest in their hands.” (Lindblom 1977, 172-3).  
 Second, governments are dependent on capital owners as well (Lindblom 1977; Swank 
2002). This dependency is partly rooted in the nature of democratic politics and the related 
institutions. It is broadly accepted that politicians are seeking for re-election. A consequence of 
this assumption is that politicians need electoral support in order to get re-elected. An essential 
determinant in this regard is the performance of the economy. If the economy prospers and the 
society profits, voters tend to support the ruling politicians. Contrastingly, in periods of 
economic downturn electoral support usually declines (Block 1997, 15). Yet, as described 
above, governments cannot control capital owners’ decisions regarding the allocation of 
resources and investment. Therefore, they are dependent on them for a good performing 
economy and eventually, re-election. In other words, governments are dependent on capital 
owners because voters are. 
 However, governments are also dependent on capital owners for the support for their 
programs and personnel (Block 1997; Swank 2002). Both government programs and personnel 
are ultimately financed by taxes. Thus, governments need at least a minimal level of economic 
activity to extract the necessary revenues. In this regard, governments are again dependent on 
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the willingness of capital owners to invest in order to maintain the necessary level of economic 
activity.  
Finally, the structural dependence thesis assumes that governments act in accordance 
with the preferences of capital owners. The bulk of the literature argues that the main interest 
of capital owners is to obtain the most profitable rate of return on their investment (Swank 
2002). Typical features of a generous welfare state as high minimal wage, generous social 
insurance schemes and the corresponding higher tax rate to finances them, are typically seen as 
inefficient by capital owners in the sense that they might affect the rate of return on their 
investments. Consequently, governments face a trade-off between equality and efficiency 
(Prezeworski and Wallerstein 1988). According to this thesis, governments will prefer 
economic growth over distribution and thus, are reluctant in implementing policies that might 
affect the expected rate of return for capital owners.  
The structural dependence thesis predicts that globalisation will increase the pressure 
on governments to reduce welfare state spending in order to improve the competitiveness of 
domestic firms. The opening and integration of domestic markets have resulted in the rapidly 
growing movement of goods and services throughout the world. As a consequence, firms no 
longer compete solely on a domestic level. Instead, they increasingly face global competition.  
In this context, welfare state spending is perceived problematic since it negatively 
affects both the competitiveness of domestic firms and the return on investment for capital 
owners (Garrett 2001; Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 150). Since welfare state spending is 
ultimately funded by taxes, increasing welfare state expenditure will result in higher taxes.1 A 
relatively high tax burden has also negative effects on the competitiveness of domestic firms 
since it increases costs of labour and correspondingly production costs. Additionally, taxes 
lower the rate of return on investments which undermines capital owners’ willingness to invest. 
 Due to globalisation the mobility of firms and capital owners is increased, creating 
opportunities for tax avoidance by moving to low-tax countries (Genschel 2011, 123). 
Consequently, governments have to compete with each other to improve the competitiveness 
of exposed domestic firms and retain and attract investment by capital owners. The efficiency 
hypothesis predicts that the tax-competition between governments becomes a prisoner’s 
                                                        
1 In the short term, welfare state spending might be funded by borrowing, which is known to increase real 
interest rates. In this case, investment will become costlier and thereby is likely to decrease. The competitive 
position of domestic firms can potentially be deteriorated, when borrowing causes an appreciation in the real 
exchange rate.  
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dilemma in which governments continue to cut welfare state spending to reduce taxes. This 
results in a race-to-the-bottom that potentially hollows out the welfare state. 
 
2.2 The compensation hypothesis 
 
In sharp contrast to the efficiency hypothesis, the compensation hypothesis predicts that 
globalisation will result in welfare state expansion, rather than welfare state retrenchment. 
According to this hypothesis, welfare states expand in order to insure citizens in open 
economies against the risks and economic insecurity associated with globalisation. In this 
regard, the compensation hypothesis includes the demand-side of welfare state spending, 
whereas the efficiency hypothesis focusses solely on the supply-side of the welfare state and its 
economic costs. The causal inference underlying the compensation hypothesis starts with the 
assumption that globalisation increases economic risks in societies. This is explained by 
increased domestic economic volatility associated with globalisation or the structural 
adjustment of domestic economies induced by globalisation. Consequently, citizens will 
demand social protection from the government, which translates in increased social security 
and welfare state spending. 
Cameron’s (1978) analysis of 18 OECD countries was the first study to empirically 
show the correlation between economic openness and the expansion of the welfare state, 
measured as the change in total taxes as a percentage of GDP. In his theoretical framework, 
Cameron draws on the work of Lindbeck (1975; 1976), who argues that governments aim to 
mitigate the effect of globalisation by increasing the scope of the public economy. Cameron 
himself, however, argues that the high industrial concentration that is associated with small 
open economies leads to high levels of unionization, strong labour confederation and leftist-
dominated governments (1978, 1256). This, in turn, results in the expansion of the welfare state. 
In the same vein, Stephens (1979) emphasizes the importance of union organization and social 
democratic parties in explaining the linkages between economic openness and large welfare 
states. Additionally, Katzenstein (1984) concludes that economic openness results in increasing 
welfare state spending within the smaller economies of Northern Europe due to their ability to 
adjust to fluctuations of the global economy through their institutional structure. In this regard, 
he emphasizes the importance of national policy strategies of domestic compensation. 
 Several decades later, Rodrik (1998) further advanced the existing evidence supporting 
the compensation hypothesis. Based on a broad 100 plus country sample, his results confirm 
that there is a positive correlation between economic openness (exports plus imports divided 
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by GDP) and government spending (the share of government expenditure in GDP). Yet, 
whereas the causal interferences presented in the aforementioned studies focus specifically on 
small, open economies, Rodrik (1998) provides a broader causal explanation. Motivated by his 
sample including developing and developed countries, he argues that governments increase 
welfare state spending in order to provide social insurance against the external risks associated 
with economic openness. Consistent with this argument, many studies find similar results 
(Quinn 1997; Garret 1998; Hick 1999; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). Additionally, the following 
studies (Slaughter 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Walter 2010; 2017) analyse the causal 
links between globalisation and welfare state expansion underlying the compensation 
hypothesis are notable in this regard 
 
2.3  Globalisation and domestic institutions 
 
A third line of scholars argue that globalisation and welfare state spending are mediated by 
political and institutional conditions. The argumentation in this regard is that the political 
demand and supply of welfare state spending is influenced by country-specific characteristics 
as national histories, institutional constraints and policy feedback mechanisms. This line of 
argumentation has its roots in the work of Pierson (1996, 2001) on the ‘new politics’. He argues 
that welfare states have been resistant to retrenchments. In this respect, he emphasizes that 
welfare politics are primarily determined by the domestic struggles associated with the 
historical development of a county’s welfare state. Consequently, exogenous developments, 
like globalisation, cannot explain the level of welfare state spending. 
 Swank (2002) has extended this logic to the case of globalisation. Based on the work of 
Rothstein (1998), he argues that the institutional structure of a welfare state determines whether 
globalisation results in retrenchment. He argues that universal welfare states create high levels 
of political support and are consequently better able to resist globalisation-induced 
retrenchment pressures compared to their liberal counterparts (2002, 33). A finding that is also 
supported by the work of Moene and Wallerstein (2001) and Bergh (2004). Scholars like Korpi 
and Palme (2003), Allan and Scruggs (2004) and Kwon and Pontusson (2005) provide a related, 
but slightly different argument. They argue that class and partisan politics continue to be the 
main determinant of welfare state change. 
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3 Argument and Development of Hypotheses 
 
3.1    The varying impact of globalisation across welfare programmes 
 
This study argues that the impact of globalisation on welfare state spending is not uniform 
across welfare state programmes. In this regard, this study builds further on the work of 
Burgoon (2010), who argues that the compensation hypothesis and the efficiency hypothesis 
oversimplify the politics linking globalisation and welfare state spending. This 
oversimplification is at best rooted in the lack of explicit hypotheses regarding the key political 
actors (globalisation’s (potential) losers, capital owners and governments) in the political 
conflict underlying globalisation. At worse, this can explained by the fact that this studies 
assume that the preferences of their main actors, respectively the (potential) losers of 
globalisation (the compensation hypothesis) and the capital owners (the efficiency hypothesis), 
are uniform.  
On the one hand, (potential) losers of globalisation are assumed to demand 
compensation via programmes that directly answer to their short-term needs (Burgoon 2000, 
521). Typical programmes in this regard are active labour market programmes and 
unemployment benefits. Other policies that are assumedly preferred are public employment and 
labour-standard regulations. On the other hand, welfare state programmes like health-care 
benefits, retirement benefits, family benefits and housing benefits only answer to indirect or 
long-term needs of the population. Given their nature, this type of programmes is less popular 
among the (potential) losers. 
A similar argument is valid concerning the preferences of capital owners. Two 
considerations guide the preferences of capital owners: the costs and tax burden of welfare 
programmes, and the productivity gains associated with a welfare programme (Burgoon 2001, 
522-3). With respect to the former, capital owners are assumed to oppose programmes that are 
relatively expensive and, additionally, funded with taxes that burden them. Typical examples 
in this regard are unemployment benefits and public employment. Regarding the latter 
consideration, capital owners are likely to support programmes that improve productivity and 
therefore contribute to economic growth (Burgoon 2001, 523; Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 147; 
Swank 2002, 22). Welfare programmes that meet this condition are among others education 
spending, infrastructure investment and job training and relocation programmes. 
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This study combines the assumed preferences of the (potential) losers of globalisation 
and capital owners (figure 1) and turns them into testable hypotheses. These hypotheses show 
the political conflict associated with the different type of welfare programmes. Furthermore, by 
focusing on the preferences of (potential) losers and capital owners, this study is an 
improvement in comparison to most previous literature that solely concentrates on either the 
demand-side or the supply-side of the welfare state. 
 
 
 
 First, globalisation will erode spending on welfare state programmes associated with 
low demands for compensation from (potential) losers, and strong opposition from capital 
owners. Examples of these eroding welfare programmes are health-care benefits, retirement 
benefits, family benefits, housing benefits and incapacity benefits, all shown in the left bottom 
corner of figure. In general, these programmes do not directly address (potential) loser’s short-
term needs. However, these programmes encounter strong opposition from capital owners given 
their high costs and low productivity gains. The combination of these preferences will result in 
reduced spending for these programmes. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Globalisation will result in the retrenchment of welfare state 
programmes associated with low demands for welfare compensation from 
(potential) losers and high opposition from capital owners. 
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Second, spending on welfare state programmes where globalisation causes strong 
demand for compensation from (potential) losers and support from capital owners, will expand. 
The classical example of an expanding welfare programme is ALMP in general, and 
specifically job training and relocation benefits (right top corner of figure 1) As described 
above, the (potential) losers of globalisation mainly demand compensation of labour-market 
policies in general. Turning to the capital owners, they support programmes that yield 
productivity benefits. Combining the mutual interests of losers and capital owners will result in 
increased spending for job training and relocation benefits.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Globalisation will result in increased spending for welfare state 
programmes associated high demands for compensation from (potential) losers 
and support from capital owners. 
 
However, welfare state programmes where globalisation induces both strong demands 
from (potential) losers and strong opposition from capital owners, are associated with political 
struggle and an ambiguous effect on welfare state spending. Facing the globalisation-induced 
economic insecurities, (potential) losers will demand compensation via unemployment 
benefits, public employment and stricter labour-standard regulations. Contrastingly, capital 
owners strongly oppose this type of programmes since they lack productivity benefits and 
increase tax burdens. This study assumes that the institutional conditions that mediate the 
political conflict determine the effect of globalisation on these erratic programmes (Burgoon 
2001, 526).  
The previous section of this study already discussed the typical and well-studied 
examples mediating institutional conditions; welfare state structure (Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Swank 2002), class (Korpi 2003) and partisanship (Allan and Scruggs 2004; Kwon and 
Pontusson). This study acknowledges the potential effect of these type of institutional 
conditions and will therefore control for these variables in its analysis. Yet, this study states 
that they are not the most important conditions mediating the relationship between globalisation 
and government spending. Instead, it argues that the institutional structure of welfare 
programme themselves mediates the political conflict between (potential) losers and capital 
owners. Thereby, it argues that the differences in electoral support for programmes targeted 
towards the low-income groups on the one hand, and universal programmes on the other hand, 
alter the balance of political power between (potential) losers and capital owners. The shift in 
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this balance results in varying effects of globalisation on spending levels per institutional 
structure.  
 
3.2    The mediating effect of welfare programmes’ institutional structure 
 
This study’s main argument is that a welfare programmes’ institutional structure mediates the 
impact of globalisation on welfare programmes associated with political conflict. More 
specifically, it argues that the effect of globalisation on expenditures on welfare programme 
that are targeted towards the low-income groups will be catalysed in the case of a negative 
relationship and weakened in the case of a positive relationship. 
This argument is rooted in what Korpi and Palme (1998) describe as the paradox of 
redistribution: the more targeted the programme, the less likely it is to tackle poverty and 
inequality. Other studies (Bowles and Gintis 1996; Korpi and Palme 1998; Moene and 
Wallerstein 2001; Bergh 2004; Kenworthy 2011; Jacques and Noël 2018) also show this 
paradox. The paradox of redistribution can be explained by the differences in electoral support 
for targeted and universal welfare programmes. Targeted programmes have a relatively small 
and isolated electoral base due to the zero-sum conflict that is associated with this type of 
programme. On the one hand, the middle-class co-finances targeted programmes but is not 
eligible to receive them. Low-incomes, on the other hand, do not contribute to the financing of 
the programme, yet only they receive targeted benefits. This discrepancy offers no rational 
foundation for coalition building between the middle-class and the low-income groups. 
Targeted programmes also receive relatively little political support for other reasons. 
Namely, they cause public discussion on the worthiness and deservingness of welfare policy, 
resulting in resistance to redistributive programmes (Larsen 2008). Additionally, targeted 
programmes create negative experience and stigma for the low-income groups, and reduce 
social trust (Van Oorschot 2002; Kumlin 2004; De Neubourgh 2007; Rothstein 2010). Whereas 
the adverse effects of targeted programmes prevent coalition building between the low-income 
groups and the middle-class, universal programmes do not suffer from these drawbacks and 
consequently allow for coalition building. 
Extending this logic to the case of globalisation, this study argues that spending on 
targeted welfare programmes associated with high demands from (potential) losers and strong 
opposition from capital owners will decrease more, or increase less, relative to their universal 
counterparts. This difference is caused by the smaller and isolated electoral base of targeted 
programmes, which makes it easier for governments to meet retrenchment demands from 
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capital owners. Put differently, the electoral costs of welfare retrenchments are relatively low 
for programmes that only benefit the low-income groups. Opposingly, universal welfare 
programmes, which have a broader electoral base, bear relatively high electoral costs. 
Consequently, they are less sensitive to globalisation-induced pressures from capital owners for 
retrenchment.  
This argument also works the other way around. On the one hand, demands to increase 
spending on targeted programmes have little political weight given the small electoral base that 
is eligible for this type of programmes. Besides, meeting demands to increase spending on 
targeted programme yields relatively little electoral gain for political parties. On the other hand, 
demands to increase spending on universal programmes are supported by a more substantial 
part of the electorate. Consequently, it is electorally more rewarding to meet these demands. 
In summary, the small and isolated electoral base of targeted programmes makes them 
more sensitive to retrenchment demands from capital owners. Contrastingly, universal 
programmes supported by a broader electoral base are better able to withstand the retrenchment 
demands. Besides, whereas the electoral characteristics of targeted programmes result in 
presumably unsuccessful demands to increase spending, demands to increase spending on 
universal programmes are more likely to succeed.  
     
Hypothesis 3: The institutional structure of welfare programmes mediates the 
relationship between globalisation and government spending on programs 
characterized by political conflict, as targeted programmes, relatively to their 
universal counterparts, intensify a potential negative relationship and weaken a 
potential positive relationship. 
 
The institutional structure of a welfare state programme mediates the relationship 
between globalisation and government spending, in such a way that when a programme 
becomes increasingly targeted, the effect of globalisation on government spending is intensified 
in case of an initial negative effect and is weakened in case of an initial positive effect. 
 The three hypotheses formulated above each predict the effect of globalisation on 
welfare state spending by focussing on the outcome of the political conflict between the 
(potential) losers of globalisation and capital owners. Thereby, this study assumes that the 
former group demands compensation for the globalisation-induced economic insecurity via 
programmes that directly answer their short-term needs. In contrast, the latter group strongly 
opposes programmes that are associated with high tax burdens and that do not yield productivity 
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benefits. The political conflict that results from the combination of opposing preferences from 
(potential) loser and capital results for three type of welfare programmes in clear outcomes: 
expansion, retrenchment or the status quo. However, the outcome of the political conflict 
underlying programmes associated with high demands from (potential) losers and strong 
opposition from capital owners is indeterminate. This study is the first to argue that in these 
cases the structure of welfare state programmes themselves is decisive. 
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4 Data, Measures and Method 
 
4.1 The dependent variable: welfare state spending  
 
This study’s dependent variable is welfare state spending. In correspondence with most of the 
aforementioned literature that analysed the relationship between globalisation and welfare state 
spending (Burgoon 2001; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002), this study uses social 
expenditure data as a measure of welfare state spending. However, the usage of this type of 
measure is not immune to criticism (Esping-Andersen 1998; Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and 
Scruggs 2004). In fact, the selection of measures to compare welfare states is a heavily debated 
topic in the literature, known as ‘the dependent variable problem’ (Starke 2006; Green-Pedersen 
2007).2 
 First, some scholars have argued that aggregated social expenditure data do not show 
how, and on whom, governments spend money (Esping-Andersen 1998; Korpi and Palme 2003; 
Allan and Scruggs 2004). Consequently, expenditure data cannot show whether and how 
governments compensate the (potential) losers of globalisation by increasing welfare state 
spending. In this regard, relying on this type of data to analyse the actual impact of welfare 
compensation for (potential) losers would be inappropriate. This study acknowledges this 
critique, yet it argues that it is not related to this study. As pointed out by Green-Pedersen (2007, 
5) it can theoretically be justified to rely on social expenditure data to analyse the development 
of welfare state spending. This study’s focus on the institutional structure of welfare 
programmes, that determine the way how, and on whom, governments spend money, 
theoretically justify the usage of social expenditure data as a measure to capture welfare state 
development. Second, it is shown that social expenditure data do not only reflect welfare state 
change, but also cyclical and demographic factors (Hicks and Zorn 2003; Starke 2006; Kühner 
2007; Castles 2009; Hudson and Kühner 2010). This study is aware of these factors and 
includes several variables to control for these effect.  
 This study includes two aggregated spending measures: total social security transfers as 
a percentage of GDP, and total public and mandatory social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP. These measures are included to provide a generalized perspective of the relationship 
between globalisation and welfare state spending. Data regarding both these measures are 
                                                        
2 For an extensive overview regarding this debate see for instance Green-Pedersen (2004), Clasen and Siegel 
(2007), and Hudson and Kühner (2010). 
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derived from the Data regarding these measures are derived from Armingeon et al.’s (2017) 
Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS).3 The first measure, total social security transfers 
includes social assistance grants and welfare benefits for sickness, old age, family, social 
assistance grants, and welfare. The second, total public and social expenditure, groups the 
following benefits: old-age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health-care, family, active 
labour market policies (ALMP), unemployment, housing-support and other social policy areas. 
 Note that this study uses measures that include both public and mandatory private social 
expenditures.4 In this regard, it uses a broader measure compared to most literature. There are 
two arguments justifying this methodological choice. First, the legally mandatory character of 
mandatory private makes them more or less a variation on public social support. Consequently, 
including mandatory private social expenditure gives a better picture of the total of social 
support that governments provide. Second, in some countries (among others the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States), mandatory private social expenditures typically 
account for a significant share of the provided social support (Adema 2001; Pearson and Martin 
2005; Adema et al. 2011). Consequently, including only public social expenditures would result 
in an incorrect representation of the differences in social support provided by the government 
across different countries.  
 However, this study mainly focusses on individual welfare programmes. Therefore, it 
includes eight different individual programmes: health-care benefits, retirement benefits, 
family benefits, housing-support benefits, incapacity-related benefits, ALMP, job training and 
relocation benefits, and unemployment benefits. Data are retrieved from the CPDS (Armingeon 
et al. 2017). The individual welfare programmes are defined in the following way (Adema et 
al. 2011, 123).; 
 
1. Health-care benefits – Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical good and 
prevention. 
                                                        
3 Note that the original source of data on social expenditure measures included in CPDS (Armingeon et al. 2017) 
is the OECD (2017) Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). 
4 The SOCX database distinguishes public and private social expenditures on based on whoever controls the 
relevant financial flows (OECD 2010). Consequently, public expenditures are defined as social spending with 
financial flows controlled by the government (all levels of government and social security funds included). With 
the respect to the latter category, the SOCX database makes a second distinction between mandatory and voluntary 
private social expenditures. Mandatory private social expenditures include social support stemming from 
government legislation but operated through the financial sector. Contrastingly, voluntary private social 
expenditures include all completely privately-operated programmes that involve the redistribution of resources. 
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2. Incapacity-related benefits – Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from 
occupational injury and accident legislation and employee sickness payments. 
3. Retirement benefits – Following Burgoon (2001), this study combines old-age and 
survivors’ benefits to measure expenditures on retirement benefits. The two categories 
include: pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help and residential services for the 
elderly, and funeral payments. 
4. Family benefits – Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support 
during leave, and sole parent payments. 
5. Housing-support benefits - Housing allowances and rent subsidies. 
6. ALMP – Expenditures on public employment services and administration; expenditures 
on training; expenditures on job rotation and job training; expenditures on employment 
incentives; expenditures on supported employment and rehabilitation; expenditures on 
direct job creation; expenditures on start-up incentives (Adema et al. 2011, 123).  
7. Job training and relocation benefits – This measure includes the expenditures on the 
productivity improving categories of ALMP, which are training and job rotation and job 
training. 
8. Unemployment benefits – Unemployment compensation and early retirement for labor 
market reasons. 
In order to test whether the effect of globalisation differs per welfare programme this study 
categorized the above programmes in the following way. First, health-care benefits, incapacity-
related benefits, retirement benefits, family benefits, and housing-support benefits are 
categorized as eroding welfare programmes. Recall that this type of programmes is associated 
with low demand from (potential) losers since they do not directly answer their short-term 
needs. Besides, capital owners strongly oppose this type of programmes given the fact that they 
do not improve productivity.  
 Second, ALMP and job training and relocation benefits are categorized as expanding 
welfare programmes. This type of programmes is strongly demanded by the (potential) losers 
of globalisation since they meet their short-term demands. Likewise, capital owners presumably 
support this type of programmes since they yield productivity gains.  
 Finally, unemployment benefits are categorized as an erratic welfare programme. This 
type of programmes is associated with heavy demands form (potential) losers of globalisation 
and strong opposition from capital owners resulting in an uncertain outcome of the political 
conflict underlying the relationship between globalisation and welfare state spending. 
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Consequently, a welfare state programmes’ institutional structure becomes important and 
meditates the relationship between the globalisation and welfare state spending. More 
specifically, this study argues that the unemployment benefits that are targeted toward low-
income groups will be characterized by sharper retrenchment or less expansion compared to 
their universal counterparts. 
 
4.2 The independent variables 
 
4.2.1 Globalisation 
 
Globalisation is conceptualised in many different ways within the welfare state literature 
(Koster 2009; Starke 2006). Whereas most studies focus on globalisation the economic 
dimension of globalisation (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Burgoon 2001; Mahler 2004; Kittel and 
Winner 2005; Plümper et al. 2005), some others have focussed on globalisation in a broader 
perspective. A well-known example in this regard is the work of Dreher et al (2008), who argue 
that globalisation not only entails an economic dimension, but also social and political 
dimensions. This study, however, is limited to the economic dimension of globalisation. Both 
scholars in the compensation and efficiency school, as well as schools who argue that 
globalisation is unrelated to welfare state spending, rely (solely) on these economic measures 
(Iversen and Cusack 2000; Burgoon 2001; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Castles 2004; Kittel and 
Winner 2005; Hays et al. 2005; Busemeyer 2009). This shows that the use of variables that 
measure globalisation purely from an economic perspective are not biased, justifying this 
study’s limited focus. 
This study includes three measure of globalisation in order to analyse the relationship 
between globalisation and welfare state spending. The first measure is trade openness, which is 
defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services, expressed as the percentages 
of GDP.5 The inclusion of this measure is more-or-less standard in the literature and has already 
been used by a wide variety of scholars going back to Cameron (1978). Data on the summed 
value of imports and exports are from the World Bank (2017).  
Second, this study includes foreign direct investment (FDI) flows as a measure of 
globalisation. This measure captures the increased capital openness associated with 
                                                        
5 Hays et al. (2005) provide an interesting argument regarding the use of the summed value of imports and 
exports. They argue that is questionable whether imports and exports have a different effect on governments 
spending. Whereas increases of the former creates (potential) losers, rising exports do not.  
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globalisation and the growing activity of global firms (Swank 2002). Moreover, studies that 
focussed on the effect of globalisation on an individual’s perception of economic insecurity 
have argued that industries with a relatively high exposure to FDI exhibit a higher labour-
market volatility (Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Walter 2010). Consequently, it is argued that 
individuals working in these industries are more insecure regarding their job and salaries, which 
might translate in increasing demands for compensation via welfare state spending. This study 
defines this measure as the sum of inflows and outflows of FDI, expressed as percentage of 
GDP. Data regarding these two flows are retrieved form the World Bank (2017) and combined 
by this study. 
Finally, the share of low wage imports as a percentage of total imports is included as a 
measure of globalisation. It has been argued that imports from low wage countries intensify the 
effect of globalisation on people’s perception of economic insecurity (Burgoon 2001; Garrett 
and Mitchell; Slaughter 2001; Mahler 2004; Hays et al 2005; Walter 2010, 2017). This effect 
can be explained by the fact that they are produced with relatively abundant goods and services 
have a comparative advantage (Stopler-Samuelson tradition 1941). Since low-educated 
individuals are relatively abundant in low wage countries, globalisation increases international 
competition for low-educated individuals in developed countries. This will presumably increase 
feelings of economic insecurity and might result in increasing demands for compensation. The 
World Bank (2017) provides data regarding the share of imports from low- and middle-income 
countries expressed as a percentage of total imports of a county. Note that the World Bank 
differentiates this variable in imports from economies in six regions (East Asia and Pacific, 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa and Sub-Shararn Africa). This study adds them together into one variable. 
 
4.2.2 The institutional structure of welfare programmes 
 
To examine how the institutional structure of unemployment benefit programmes mediates the 
effect of globalisation, this study uses dummy variables based on concentration indices. 
Concentration indices are particularly used to measure and compare socio-economic health 
inequality. However, they are also used for a wide range of other applications. For instance, 
Kakwani (1977; 1979) introduced concentration indices as a measure of progressivity in 
taxation and public expenditure. In line with Kakwani’s approach, Korpi and Palme (1998) 
used a concentration index (they refer to it as the ‘index of targeting transfer income’) to support 
their proposed paradox of redistribution. Additionally, recent studies that analysed the 
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relationship between targeting and redistribution also include concentration indices (Mahler 
and Jesuit 2006; Kenworthy 2011; Wang and Caminada 2011, 2017). This study takes a similar 
approach and calculates concentration indices for unemployment benefits. 
Concentration indices are defined in relation to the concentration curve (Kakwani 1977, 
1979; O’Donnell et al. 2007; Wagstaff 2011). A concentration curve plots the cumulative 
proportion of the population, ordered by the ranking variable (beginning with the lowest value), 
against the cumulative proportion of the variable of interest (Wagstaff et al. 1991). This is 
reflected in figure 2, where !" is the concentration curve and #$ is the so-called equality 
diagonal. Hereby, the concentration index, denoted by %, is twice the area between !" and the #$.  
 
Figure 4.1 – Concentration curve (based on Kakwani 1977, 1979) 
     
The relative position of the concentration curve (!") compared to the inequality diagonal 
(#$) determines the value of the concentration index; it is positive if the concentration curve 
lies below the inequality diagonal and negative when the concentration curve lies above this 
diagonal. The above is formally denoted in the following formula:  
 % = 1 − 2∫ !"($)#$-. . 
In this formula the C is bounded between -1 and 1. If the ranking variable is discrete, 
then 1) can be rewritten as (Wagstaff et al. 2007): 
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% = /0∗2 ∑ 4565 − 1057- , 
where 8 = (1/:)∑ ;5057-  is the mean of the variable of interest, 45, and 65 = </= is the 
fractional rank of the <th population member, with < = 1 for the lowest ranked member and < == for the highest ranked member. By defining the concentration index as the covariance 
between unemployment benefits and the fractional rank in the socioeconomic status distribution, 
this can be rewritten as (Kakwani 1980; Wagstaff 2011):   
 % =	 /2 cov(B, 6). 
This study relies on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database for the necessary 
data to calculate concentration indices on unemployment benefits. LIS collects and harmonizes 
micro-data from individual countries in waves based on a five-year interval.6 LIS data is among 
others used by Korpi and Palme (1998), Mahler and Jesuit (2006), Wang and Caminada (2011) 
and Huber and Stephens (2014).  
 Following Wang and Caminada (2011, 15-6) this study uses households’ pre-tax income 
as the ranking variable in the above described formula. A households’ pre-tax income includes 
primary income (gross wage and salaries, self-employment income, cash property income, 
occupational and private pensions, private transfers and other cash income) and social security 
transfers (Wang and Caminada 2017, 18).7 With respect to the variable of interest, LIS provides 
an aggregated measure of total unemployment benefits (2017). This variable consists out of:  1) 
short-term monetary transfers from the unemployment insurance aimed to compensate for the 
partial or total loss of labour income and to help the job seeker integrate into the labour market, 
2) monetary transfers from unemployment public programmes, which are aimed at covering the 
whole population or a part of the population selected based on other criteria than previous 
employment existence or income or asset thresholds, and 3) monetary transfers from 
unemployment social programmes targeted towards individuals or households in need. 
Subsequently, this study creates 127 concentration indices for unemployment benefit 
programmes. These concentration indices capture the following twelve countries divided over 
seven waves: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,  
                                                        
6 For an in-debt review of the LIS database and how it for instance differs with the various OECD datasets see 
Ravallion (2015) and Gasparini and Törmälehto (2015). 
7 The LIS database (2017) refers to this variable as total household income (hi). Consistent with households’ pre-
taks income this variable includes 1) total monetary payment from labour, poverty, and social or private transfers, 
and 2) the of non-monetary goods and services received from labour and social or private transfers (LIS 2017). 
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Table 4.1 – Concentration indices
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Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (see table 5.1) This table shows that 
unemployment benefits in Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom have become more targeted from the beginning of the 1990’s to 2013. This 
development is in line with arguments presented by Atkinson (2008), Ghysels and Van Lancker 
 (2011) and Lundvall and Lorenz (2012), who stated that governments would increase target 
benefits in order to get more welfare out of every euro invested. Furthermore, this study’s 
concentration indices on the level of unemployment benefits are relatively similar to the 
concentration indices of social security transfer calculated by Wang and Caminada (2017). This 
might indicate that the way governments target social security transfers corresponds with the 
way they target unemployment benefit programmes.  
Based on these indices, this study creates a dummy variable to analyse whether 
globalisation results in less spending on targeted unemployment benefit programmes relative 
to universal programmes. To categorize the concentration indices into dummy variables this 
study uses quintiles. Quintiles are well known in the economic inequality literature (Deininger 
and Squire 1996; Barro 2000; Best 2018) and are commonly used to create cut-off points. The 
first quintile of concentration indices, based on a ranking from low to high, are categorized as 
targeted. Put differently, the programmes with a concentration index lying in the lowest twenty 
percent of all concentration indices are categorized as targeted. Correspondingly, each 
unemployment benefit programme with a concentration rate of minus 0.1 is classified as 
targeted. Note that the classification of dummy variables is generally perceived as arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, this study is convinced that it makes a logical and justified choice in this regard. 
Finally, this study acknowledges that the use of dummy variables is generally associated 
with a loss of data richness. However, when examining the effect of a welfare programme’s 
institutional structure on the relationship between globalisation and government spending, the 
use of dummy variables representing this institutional structure allows for a clear-cut 
comparison between the meditating effect of targeted programmes relative to their universal 
counterparts. As this is exactly what this study aims for, the inclusion of dummy variables 
contributes to the straightforwardness and comprehensiveness of the analyses used in this 
research. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
 
4.3.1 Socio-economic variables 
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It is argued that both the compensation and efficiency hypothesis overestimate the effect of 
globalisation on welfare state spending.8 Instead, the technologically induced transformation of 
labour markets increases economic insecurity among the population sparking demands for 
compensation via increased welfare state spending (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Iversen 2001). 
To control for the potentially positive relation between deindustrialisation and welfare state 
spending, this study includes a measure of deindustrialization. The measure is operationalized 
according to Iversen and Cusack (2000, 348), who operationalize deindustrialization as hundred 
minus the sum of manufacturing and agricultural employment as a percentage of the working 
population.9 In this regard, it relies on the data from the (CPDS) (Armingeon et al. 2017). 
 As discussed above, changes in unemployment caused by cyclical factors may affect 
the level of welfare state spending (Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 162; Caminada et al. 2012, 117; 
Starke et al. 2014, 226). Consequently, this study controls for the effect of unemployment by 
including the unemployment rate in its analysis. Based on previous studies (Korpi and Plame 
2003; Genschel 2004; Hicks and Zorn 2005), it is expected that increasing unemployment is 
associated with increased expenditures on unemployment-related programmes, like 
unemployment benefits, ALMP and training and relocation benefits. However, some studies 
show that the unemployment rate is also positively correlated with other welfare state 
programmes like family benefits (Burgoon 2001) and disability benefits (Moene and 
Wallerstein 2003).  The unemployment rate is operationalized as the number of unemployment 
of the civilian labour force as percentage of the total civilian labour force. Data in this regard 
are retrieved from the CPDS (Armingeon et al. 2017).  
 Additionally, this study includes real GDP per capita to control for a county’s level of 
economic development. Meltzer and Richard (1983) show that the increases in income are 
positively correlated with a population’s willingness to pay for social security programmes. 
This development, known as Wagner’s Law, predicts that higher levels of GDP per capita are 
associated with more generous welfares states. Contrastingly, some studies have shown that 
GDP per capita is significantly and negatively correlated to the level of welfare state spending 
(Swank 2002). This negative correlation can be explained by the fact that increasing income 
levels lowers the dependents on welfare programme’s. Nevertheless, both arguments justify the 
inclusion of GDP per capita as a control variable. The study operationalizes this variable as real 
                                                        
8 A slightly different argument focussing on the individual level is put forward by Rhem (2009). He argues that 
an individual’s policy preferences regarding redistribution policies is determined by skill specificity and 
occupational unemployment rates, rather than international competition at the industry level. 
9 This way of operationalizing deindustrialisation is still common practice in the recent literature (Kwon and 
Pontusson 2010; Van Vliet and Wang 2017)  
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GDP per capita and relies on the Comparative Welfare States (CWS) database (Brady et al. 
2016) for data.  
 Finally, this study accounts for the countercyclical quality of most welfare programmes 
by including economic growth, operationalized as the percentage change in GDP. It is expected 
that there is a negative correlation between economic growth and expenditures on welfare state 
programmes (Castles 200). Besides, it argued that the budgetary pressures stemming from 
economic downturns have a negative effect on welfare state expenditures (Hicks and Zorn 
2005). To control for this effect this study includes the annual deficit, expressed as a percentage 
of GDP. This measure is operationalized as the overall balance divided by the net lending of 
the general government. The data underlying these variables is derived from the CPDS 
(Armingeon et al. 2017). 
 
4.3.2 Demographic variables 
 
Expenditures on welfare state programmes may be positively correlated with the number of 
people dependent on these programmes (Hicks and Zorn 2003; Mahler 2004; Dreher and 
Gaston 2006). This correlation can be explained by; 1) the greater share of dependency of the 
population, the greater the need to provide a certain level of welfare, and 2) the greater the share 
of dependent individuals, the larger the share of the electorate with an interest in (at least) 
maintaining similar levels of welfare state expansion (Hicks and Zorn 2003, 498). This study 
includes three variables to control for these effects; the share the population that can be 
classified as young, the share of elderly in the population, and the share of the labour force with 
only basic education. 
The first two variables are preferred over the inclusion of the frequently used 
dependency ratio (Burgoon 2001; Garrett 2001; Dreher et al. 2007; Pontusson and Kwon 2010). 
Dependency ratios capture the percentage of the population younger than 15 and older than 65. 
Consequently, it is suitable to capture demographic trends in relation to aggregated welfare 
state spending measures. However, this study analyses both welfare state spending in general 
as well as individual welfare state programmes. Due to the inclusion of a variety of different 
individual programmes, that serve different groups in the population, it is important to 
differentiate between the effects of the share of young and elderly in the population, since they 
presumably have varying effects on different programmes. For instance, previous research has 
shown that the share of elderly has a positive effect on spending on retirement, health-care and 
incapacity benefits (Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Castles 2004; Hicks and Zorn 2005). 
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Consequently, this study expects that the share of elderly is positively related to these 
programmes. Opposingly, since the share of young is expected to be positively correlated with 
expenditures on family benefits (Dreher and Gaston 2006), this study expects that the share of 
young has a positive effect on family benefits. Based on data drawn from the CPDS (Armingeon 
et al. 2017), this study operationalizes the share of young (population under 15) and the share 
of old (population over 65), as a percentage of the total population. 
Turning to the share of labour force with only basic education, Walter (2010; 2017) has 
convincingly argued that the effects of globalisation are not homogeneously affecting feelings 
of economic insecurity among the population. Namely, globalisation increases feelings of 
economic insecurity among the low-educated part of the population but decreases them among 
the high-educated part of the population. This heterogenous effect of globalisation on economic 
insecurity can be explained by models in the Stopler-Samuelson tradition (1941). These models 
emphasise relative factor endowments and assume factor mobility. Thereby, they assume that 
goods and services produced with relatively abundant production factors have a comparative 
advantage. This effect is acknowledged in many studies (Burgoon 2001; Slaughter 2001; 
Mahler 2004; Hays et al 2005; Walter 2010, 2017). The relative abundance of high-educated 
individuals in developed countries results in increased demands from this type of individuals. 
Meanwhile, low-educated employees face increased competition from developing countries 
that with a typically abundance of low-skilled employees. Thus, it is expected that high-
educated individuals will profit form globalisation, whereas the low-educated individuals will 
lose.  
Based on this insight, several studies argue that particularly low-educated individuals 
will demand increased welfare state spending (Mahler 2004; Wren and Them 2014; Thewissen 
et al. 2017). Put differently, it is expected that governments in countries with relatively more 
low-educated individuals face stronger demands for welfare state expansion.10 It is important 
to take this into account when analysing the globalisation-induced demands stemming from the 
population. This study, however, argues that demands for compensation will concentrate on 
those programmes that directly answer to the short-term need of (potential) losers of 
globalisation. Consequently, this study only controls for the share of labour force with basic 
                                                        
10 Additionally, Moene and Wallerstein (2003) argued that low-wage employees are relatively more supportive 
towards unemployment insurance programmes in comparison to high-wage employees. Assuming that low-wage 
employees and low-educated employees are generally identical, this is another argument to control for the 
percentage of low-educated individuals as part of the total labour force.  
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education for those programmes that meet this criterium. Data underlying this variable are 
retrieved from the World Bank Database (2018). 
  
4.3.3 Domestic institution variables 
 
As discussed in the theoretical section of this study, a substantial strand of the literature argues 
that changes in welfare state spending are predominantly caused by domestic political 
institutions (Garret 1995; Swank 2002; Swank 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001; Korpi and Palme 
2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Kwon and Pontusson 2005). Although this claim is criticized 
(Huber and Stephans 2001; Kittel and Winner 2005), Potrafke (2017) recently argued that 
partisan politics might became less pronounced, it is still a relevant factor within OECD 
countries. Therefore, this study includes two measures that capture the effect of partisanship on 
welfare state expenditures: the share of cabinet post held by left-wing parties, and the share of 
cabinet post held by Christian Democratic Parties.  
With respect to left-wing parties, it is argued that they tend to have a positive effect on 
welfare state spending (Swank 2002; Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Kwon 
and Pontusson 2010). An important note in this regard is the presumably negative effect of left-
wing parties on ALMP expenditures (Rueda 2006). Contrastingly, Christian Democratic parties 
are assumed to be negatively correlated with welfare state spending. Programmes that might be 
an exception in this regard are family and health benefits (Huber et al. 1993; Fleckenstein 2011; 
Starke et al. 2014). These two variables are operationalized as the share of cabinet post of left-
wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, and the share of cabinet post of Christian-
Democratic parties in percentage of total cabinet post. In this regard, the study relies on data 
from the CPDS (Armingeon et al. 2017, based on Schmidt and Beyer 1992).11  
 Additionally, this study controls for the effect of trade unions. Some scholars argue that 
trade unions support welfare programmes which benefit low-income groups, like health-care 
benefits, unemployment benefits and disability benefits (Mahler 2004, 1031; Starke 2006,108).  
Therefore, this study controls for this effect by including bargaining coverage as a variable. 
This variable captures the “employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements as 
a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right to bargaining, 
                                                        
11 Note that the CPDS defines this variable as ‘centre parties’. However, as Armingeon et al. (2017) note centre 
parties include in particular Christian Democratic or Catholic parties. Consequently, this study’s different 
definition is not problematic.  
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expressed as percentage” (Visser 2015, 23). Data underlying this variable are retrieved from 
the CPDS (Armingeon et al. 2017, based on Visser 2015).  
 Finally, this study includes the level of employment protection as a control variable. It 
has been argued that there is a trade-off between unemployment benefits and employment 
protection (Boeri et al. 2003; Rueda 2006). It can be argued that individuals who consider 
themselves protected from globalisation by employment regulation, tend to be less supportive 
towards unemployment benefits. Consequently, high levels of employment protection should 
result in less demands for compensation. To control for this effect this study includes the sum 
of the level of employment protection for employees with regular contracts and employees with 
temporary contracts. Both these individual measures are indices scaled from 0 to 6 (higher 
values indicate stricter employment protection. Data in this regard are provided by the CPDS 
(Armingeon et al. 2017). 
 
4.4 Case selection and data availability 
 
The case selection and data availability in this study deserve some explanation. This study’s 
disaggregated focus on welfare state spending also translates into differences in available data 
for the independent and control variables. Since this study additionally uses its own calculated 
concentration indices, the amount of data available for the other independent variables further 
decreases. Considering the fact that it would be unnecessary to decrease the number of 
observations for all other welfare programmes due to the limited data available with respect to 
the received level of unemployment benefits per household, this study includes two slightly 
differing samples. 
The countries included in the analysis of globalisation on expanding and eroding 
programmes include the following fourteen OECD-countries: Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The period for which all data for the dependent, 
independent and control variables is available is 1994-2012. The countries included in the 
analysis of unemployment benefits (the included erratic programme), are corresponding with 
the above-mentioned countries with the exception of Denmark and Slovenia. The exclusion of 
these two countries results from the fact that there are no data available with respect to the 
received level of unemployment benefits per household. Additionally, since the concentration 
indices on unemployment benefits are based on the LIS dataset, the data for the other 
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independent variable is included based on an approximately five-year interval (see table the 
wave and corresponding years).  
  
4.5 Method 
 
To analyse the relationship between globalisation and spending on welfare state programmes, 
this study relies on pooled time-series cross-section regression analyses. However, as noted by 
Hicks (1994), regression analyses from pooled data using ordinary least squares are inefficient, 
biased or both, due to the behaviour of the produced error terms. He states that the errors “tend 
to be temporally autoregressive, cross-sectionally heteroskedastic, and cross-sectionally 
correlated, as well as, conceal unit and period effects, and reflect some causal heterogeneity 
cross space, time or both” (1994, 172). To deal with these complications this study mainly relies 
on the suggestions presented in the work of Beck and Katz (1995; 2011) and Plümper et al. 
(2005). 
This study combines panel-corrected standard errors with a Prais-Winsten 
transformation (AR1). First, panel-corrected standard errors correct for panel heteroscedasticity 
and contemporaneous correlation (Beck and Katz 1995). Second, since welfare state spending 
is trend-driven and the independent variables included in this study can explain this trend, it is 
necessary to correct for serial correlation in the error term with the Prais-Winsten 
transformation (AR1) (Plümper et al. 2005). This technique is preferred over the use of a lagged 
dependent variable, as the inclusion of the latter might result in inconsistent estimators (Achen 
2000; Kittel and Winner 2005; Plümper et al 2005; Podesta 2006, 546).  
 Furthermore, this study includes both unit and period dummies as suggested by Beck 
and Katz (1995) and Beck et al. (1998) to correct for unobserved country and year specific 
heterogeneity. Note that this study is aware of the fact that these dummies respectively absorb 
cross-sectional and time-series variance (Plümper et al. 2005). However, as this study analyses 
the association between globalisation and welfare state spending within countries, including 
unit and period dummies is not problematic.  
 Finally, this study includes a one-year lag for both the independent and control variables 
in the regression estimates based on yearly data to avoid endogeneity bias (Plümper et al 2009). 
Besides, the effect of policy changes is generally not visible within the timespan of one year. 
Adding a one-year lag accounts for this delay. Contrastingly, there are no lags included in the 
regression estimates where waves represent the time variable. Given the fact that a wave 
includes multiple years makes controlling for the delay of policy changes unnecessary. 
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Furthermore, lagging the independent variables creates a loss of available data that are needed 
to meet sustain a sufficient sample size.  
The regression estimations for models on the eroding and expanding welfare 
programmes is based on the following equation: 
1) !"# = 	& +	()*),"#,- + ." + /# + 0	 
 
In this estimation, ! is the dependent variable, an individual welfare programme, in 
country 1 at time 2. & is the intercept and the (′s represent the parameter estimates for the 
independent variables *)  in country 1 at time 2. The country-specific and year-specific effects 
respectively are represented by . and /. Finally, the error term 0 follows a first-order 
autoregressive process.   
 Furthermore, the regression estimations model for models on the unemployment 
benefits programme is based on the following equation: 
 !"# = 	& +	()5"# +		()6"# 	+ ()(5"# ∗ 6"#) + ()*),"# + ." + :# + 0	 
 
Here, ! is the dependent variable, unemployment spending as a percentage of GDP, in 
in country 1 at time 2. In addition, & is the intercept and the (′s represent the parameter estimates 
for the variables globalisation 5, targeting 6, and the other independent variables *)	in country 1 at time 2. Furthermore, .	represents the country-specific effects and ; represent the wave-
specific effects. Again, 0 represents the error term which follows a first-order autoregressive 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Based on the availability of all variables, the data on total social security transfers, total social 
expenditure, and the eight individual welfare programmes is presented in table 5.1. Looking at 
both aggregated measures, it can be stated that welfare state spending generally has increased. 
The only exceptions in this regard are Norway, and to a lesser extent France and Germany. It 
is noteworthy that welfare state spending in the three countries that heavily suffered from the 
finical crisis (Greece, Italy and Ireland) has increased substantially. In fact, the expenditures of 
total social security in Greece increased with almost 85 percent. 
 Focussing on the individual programmes, expenditures on all labour market related 
welfare programmes decreased in most countries. Notable exceptions are Luxembourg and 
Spain. In Luxembourg spending on all three programmes substantially increased. 
Contrastingly, in Spain spending on ALMP and training and relocation benefits increased but 
spending on unemployment benefits decreased. This might indicate that Spain’s labour market 
related welfare structure transformed from passive into active. However, based on the work of 
Martin and Swank (2004) and Van Vliet and Koster (2011) it might be expected to see this 
trend also in other countries.  
The programme that is associated with the largest increase in spending is retirement 
benefits. This increase might be explained by the greying of the European population resulting 
in increased spending on retirement benefits. Focussing on Greece, expenditure on retirement 
benefits increased with over 80 percent. This substantial increase might explain why the country 
currently is forced to cut back on retirement expenditures. Looking at the increase in 
expenditures on health-care benefits, expenditures have increased in most countries. It can be 
argued that both health-care and retirement benefits are positively related to the share of elderly 
in the population (Castles 2004; 2009).  If this is true, the greying population in Europe seems 
a heavy burden from a budgetary perspective. 
 
5.2 Aggregated welfare state spending 
 
Table 5.2 shows that trade openness is negatively and significantly correlated with total social 
security transfers (models 1 and 2). This result might be interpreted as support for the existence 
of the efficiency hypothesis as presumed by Garrett and Mitchell (2001). However, all the other 
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five correlations between measures of globalisation and aggregated welfare spending have 
mixed effects and are statistically insignificant. In this respect, these results are not in line with 
the assumption that the effect of low wage imports results in welfare state expansion or at least 
reduced welfare state retrenchment (Burgoon 2001, Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Hays et al. 
2005). In fact, these results rather provide support for claims that the expected impact of 
globalisation on welfare state spending is overestimated (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Castles 
2004; Brady et al. 2005; Kittel and Winner 2005).  
 When examining the estimated effects of the socio-economic variables, it becomes clear 
that the effect of deindustrialisation is positively correlated with welfare state spending, which 
provides support for the argument of Iversen and Cusack (2000) that the consequences of 
globalisation assumed under the compensation hypothesis are exaggerated, and that 
deindustrialisation is the true driver of welfare state expansion. However, it should be noted 
that deindustrialisation is only significantly associated with increased social security 
expenditures.  
Unemployment is, as expected (Korpi and Palme 2003; Genschel 2004; Kittel and 
Winner 2005), positively and significantly correlated to both aggregated measures of welfare 
state spending. Additionally, both economic growth and GDP per capita have a significant and 
negative effect on total social expenditures confirming the countercyclical character of welfare 
state spending (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Swank 2002; Castles 
2009; Kwon and Pontusson 2010). The positive correlation between GDP per capita and total 
social expenditures also contradicts Wagner’s Law (Meltzer and Richard 1983), assuming that 
people are prepared to spend larger share of their income to welfare if their income rises (Van 
Vliet 2011). Furthermore, deficit is negatively and significantly correlated with total social 
security transfers, providing support for the negative effect of budgetary pressures stemming 
from economic downturns (Hicks and Zorn 2005). 
 With respect to the other two categories of variables, demographic factors do not 
significantly impact any of the measures of government spending. Additionally, left-wing 
partisanship is the only variable in the category domestic institutions with significant 
coefficients. Nevertheless, the results regarding the variable are fairly surprising. In contrast to 
the results of Allan and Scruggs (2004), Kwon and Pontusson (2010) and Starke et al. (2014), 
left-wing partisanship is negatively correlated with both aggregated measures of welfare state 
spending. A possible explanation of this relationship might be rooted in the fact that left-wing 
parties govern during times of economic crisis, which constrains the possibility to pursue a 
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typically socialist agenda (Armingeon 2012; Kittel and Winner 2005). However, these results 
cannot confirm whether this is indeed the case.  
 
5.3 Eroding welfare programmes 
 
The results of the estimates of individual welfare state programmes assumingly are subject to 
retrenchment are reported in table 5.2. The effect of globalisation is only significant in model 
3, 6 and 7. FDI flows are negatively correlated with incapacity-related benefits, and low wage 
imports have a negative effect on housing-supporting and incapacity-related benefits. 
Additionally, both FDI flows and low wage imports are significantly and positively correlated 
with health-care benefits. Trade openness does not have a significant effect on any of the 
individual welfare programmes. Moreover, it is important to note that the coefficients of trade 
openness have mixed effects on the welfare programmes. This is also true for the insignificant 
coefficients of both FDI flows and low wage imports. Consequently, the results of this study 
are not in line with the hypothesis that globalisation will result in the retrenchment of welfare 
state programmes associated with low demands for welfare compensation from (potential) 
losers and high opposition from capital owners. 
Regarding the socio-economic variables, deindustrialisation is positively correlated 
with the welfare programmes in model 4, 5 and 7 (table 5.2). Yet, only the correlation between 
deindustrialization and family benefits is significant (table 5.2, model 5), contrasting the above 
statements regarding Iversen and Cusack’s (2004) argumentation. In contrast with the findings 
regarding the relation between aggregated welfare programmes and the socio-economic 
variables, only five out of twenty possible correlations are significant, contradicting the 
argument of Kittel and Winner (2005) regarding the prevalence of economic conditions in 
explaining welfare state development. However, the significant coefficients show results as 
they are expected. Unemployment is positively correlated to retirement benefits, which might 
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Table 5.2 – Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors of aggregated welfare spending, eroding programmes and 
expanding programmes 
 
 
 
             Aggregated Spending                                       Eroding Programmes                                          Expanding Programmes 
 
Social Security      Social   Health-care Retirement Family       Housing-supporting Incapacity ALMP Job training and 
Transfers  Expenditures   Benefits  Benefits  Benefits  Benefits  Benefits          Relocation  
(1)     (2)   (3)    (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    (9) 
 
Globalisation Variables 
Trade Openess (t-1) -0.054*  -0.026  0.006  -0.009  -0.003  0.001  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003 
FDI Flows (t-1)  0.002  0.001  0.005***  -0.005  0.001  -0.000  -0.002*  -0.001  -0.001 
Low Wage Imports (t-1) 0.018  -0.028  0.040***  0.005  -0.006  -0.005*  -0.031*** -0.008*  -0.006 
 
Socio-Economic Variables 
Deindustrialisation (t-1) 2.034  2.070*  -0.538  1.518  0.900*  -0.017  0.166  -0.154  -0.286 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.210***  0.241***  0.012  0.149***  -0.019  0.003  0.007  -0.004  -0.001 
GDP per Capita × 10$% (t-1) -0.082  -0.184*** -0.032  -0.033  -0.050*** 0.000  -0.026  -0.007  -0.014 
Economic Growth (t-1) -0.109  -0.203*** -0.037*  -0.136*** -0.007  -0.000  -0.015*  -0.005  -0.009 
Deficit (t-1)  -0.078*  -0.024  0.011  0.005  -0.013  -0.003  -0.005  -0.006*  -0.002 
 
Demographic Variables 
Share Young (t-1)  -0.107  0.252  0.088  0.075  -0.089*  -0.020  0.115*  -0.037  -0.010 
Share Elderly (t-1)  0.040  0.110  -0.094  0.238  -0.210*** 0.046*  0.062  -0.033  -0.003 
Basic Education (t-1) -0.027  -0.014  -0.002  -0.017  -0.006  -0.001  -0.001  0.002  0.002 
 
Domestic Institutions Variables 
Government Left (t-1)  -0.004  -0.003  -0.000  -0.004  0.001  -0.000  -0.002*  0.000  0.000 
Government Centered (t-1) -0.014*** -0.012*  -0.001  -0.006*  0.001  -0.001*  -0.003*  -0.000  -0.000 
Bargaining Coverage (t-1) -0.024  0.017  0.024***  -0.004  -0.002  -0.000  -0.007*  0.001  0.002 
Employment Protection (t-1) -0.266  -0.049  -0.006  0.035  -0.103*  0.029  0.025  -0.052  -0.020 
 
Constant   16.118  13.441  2.338  1.387  8.141  0.296  1.075  2.074  1.111 
N   174  174  174  174  174  174  174  174  173 
Rho   .505  .543  .567  .442  .471  .622  .601  .501  .355 
Adjusted R-square  0.965  0.971  0.967  0.964  0.956  0.953  0.960  0.912  0.854 
 
Notes:  Regression results are estimated using panel-corrected standard errors (not shown here); each regression model includes country and year dummies (not presented here); rho represents 
autocorrelation-coefficient of the error term, which ranges from 0 to 1. 
* p<0.1, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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indicate that unemployment stimulates early retirement (Swank 2002, 71), resulting in 
increased expenditures on retirement benefits.12 Furthermore, GDP per capita and economic 
growth are negatively associated with respectively family benefits and retirement benefits. 
Turning to the demographic measures, the share of young is somewhat surprisingly 
negatively and significantly correlated with expenditures on family benefits. This finding is in 
contrast with Dreher and Gaston (2007). Yet, the share of young is positively and significantly 
related to incapacity-related benefits. This result is unexpected since retirement-related benefits 
do not include paid leave related to sickness or injury of a dependent child (Adema et al. 2011, 
97). With respect to the share of elderly, this variable is positively and significantly correlated 
with housing-support benefits and negatively and significantly related to family benefits. These 
results confirm Castles (2009, 52) argument that doom-scenarios regarding the increasing share 
of elderly and its presumed positive relation on health-care and retirement benefits is 
exaggerated. 
As to the domestic institution measures, the partisanship variables are negatively and 
significantly correlated with four individual programmes. The Christian Democratic variable is 
responsible for three of these negative correlations, confirming the assumed negative effect on 
welfare state spending (Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004). It is noteworthy that 
the programmes that are an exception in this regard are health-care and family benefits. 
Although the variable’s coefficient is insignificant in the case of family benefits, this result 
might hint to a positive association between the two, confirming the presumed prioritization of 
the family by Christian Democratic (Huber et al. 1993, 717; Fleckenstein 2011). Additionally, 
left-wing parties are negatively and significantly associated with incapacity-related benefits. 
Although this results in accordance with findings of the effect of left-wing parties on an 
aggregated level (table 5.2), this study is not aware of any literature studies explaining 
particularly this relationship.13 
As for the other two variables, bargaining coverage is positively correlated with health-
care benefits, which might provide some support for the argument that trade unions support 
welfare programmes which benefit low-income groups (Mahler 2004, 1031; Starke 2006,108). 
Finally, employment protection is negatively correlated with family benefits which may show 
                                                        
12 Moreover, this shows that scholars should not be too keen on excluding control variables in their analysis. For 
instance, Moene and Wallerstein (2003, 504) argue that is unlikely that unemployment is positively correlated to 
retirement benefits and consequently exclude unemployment as a control variable.  
13 Note that this finding is in accordance with some anecdotical evidence from the Netherlands (De Vries 2013). 
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that the trade-off between employment protection and unemployment benefits (Boeri et al. 
2003) also exists with respect to other programmes.  
 
5.4 Expanding welfare programmes 
 
The results presented in table 5.2 (Expanding Programmes) contradict this study’s second 
hypothesis, which stated that globalisation will increase welfare state spending for programmes 
associated with support or low opposition from firms and capital owners, and high demands 
from (potential) losers of globalisation demands for welfare compensation. None of the 
measures of globalisation is positively correlated with either ALMP expenditures or spending 
on job training and relocation benefits. Moreover, low wage imports are negatively and 
significantly related to ALMP. These results do not only contradict this study’s second 
hypothesis, they are also in sharp contrast with Burgoon’s (2001) argument regarding the 
desirability of ALMP and job training and relocation benefits in particular amongst (potential) 
losers of globalisation and capital owners. Furthermore, the fact that five of the six coefficients 
are statistically insignificant contradicts with the findings of Van Vliet and Koster (2011, 230), 
who showed that globalisation and ALMP are positively correlated. Finally, the insignificant 
partisanship variables provide support for Rueda’s (2006) argument that a governments’ 
political colour makes no difference for the levels of ALMP expenditures. At the same time, 
these results contradict studies like Martin and Swank (2004) and Van Vliet and Koster (2011), 
who argue that partisanship does matter in explaining ALMP efforts. Looking at the other 
variables, the lion’s share of the coefficients is insignificant but indicate the expected effect. 
The only exception in this regard is deficit, which is in accordance with the already mentioned 
study of Van Vliet and Koster (2011, 230).  
 
5.5 Erratic welfare programmes 
 
Finally, the results of the regressions for unemployment spending and employment protection 
are reported in table 5.3. In model 1, none of the measures of globalisation is significantly 
correlated with unemployment benefits. As expected (Hicks and Zorn 2005), the unemployment 
rate is positively and significantly associated with expenditures on unemployment benefits. 
Additionally, GDP per capita and deficits are negatively and significantly related to 
unemployment benefits. The significant results of these socio-economic variables and the 
insignificant correlations between unemployment benefits and the measures of globalisation 
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and the partisanship variables are in line with the work of Kittel and Winner (2005). Finally, 
the percentage of the labour force with only basic education is positively and significantly 
correlated with spending on unemployment benefits. This might confirm this study’s 
assumption that since globalisation mainly increase feelings of economic insecurity (Walter 
2010; 2017) amongst low-educated individuals, particularly low-educated individuals will 
demand increased welfare state spending (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Mahler 2004).  
  
5.6 The mediating effect of a welfare programmes’ institutional structure 
 
The results of model 2 to 4 (table 5.3) show that the effect of globalisation, when measures as 
trade openness or FDI, is mediated by a welfare programme’s institutional structure. In both 
cases the interaction between the globalisation measure and target towards low-income groups 
is negative and significant. This indicates that programmes that are targeted towards low-
income groups are associated with relatively less spending compared to their universal 
counterparts.  
Consequently, the above presented results are in line with this study’s third hypothesis. Yet, 
recall that the hypothesis state that institutional structure of welfare programmes mediates the 
relationship between globalisation and government spending on programs characterized by 
political conflict, as targeted programmes, relatively to their universal counterparts, intensify a 
potential negative relationship and weaken a potential positive relationship can be confirmed. 
This study’s results provide only support with regard to the negative relationship. 
 As to the socio-economic variables, deindustrialisation is positively and significantly 
correlated with unemployment spending in model 4 (table 5.3). This result is in line with the 
argumentation of Iversen and Cusack (2000). Note, however, the deindustrialisation is 
insignificant in the other models. GDP per capita is negatively and significantly correlated with 
unemployment benefits in model 3, 4 and 5. This confirms the work of Castles (2009) and 
Kwon and Pontusson (2010) and contradicts Wagner’s Law (Meltzer and Richard 1983).  
Deficit is, as expected (Hicks and Zorn 2005) negatively correlated with spending on 
unemployment in model 3 and 4. Two variables that capture the share of young and the share 
of old are in all cases negatively correlated with unemployment benefits. Additionally, this 
correlation is significant in four out of six cases. A possible explanation of these results is that 
the greater that share of young and old in the population, the lower the number of people that 
are potentially eligible for unemployment benefits. Furthermore, the percentage of the labour  
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Table 5.3 – Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors of expenditures 
on unemployment benefits 
 
 
 
        Unemployment Spending 
    (1)                          (2)                   (3)                    (4)   
 
Explanatory Variables 
Targeted Towards Poor     0.837***  0.182***  -0.395  
 
Trade Openness    -0.008  -0.007   
Targeted Towards Poor * Trade     -0.012*      
 
FDI Flows     0.005    0.012  
Targeted Towards Poor * FDI      -0.020***  
 
Low wage Imports    0.014      0.034 
Targeted Towards Poor *  
Low Wage Imports         0.012  
     
 
Socio-Economic Variables 
Deindustrialization    4.076  7.658  14.605*** 8.647 
 
Unemployment    0.052*  0.024  0.024  0.032 
 
Economic Growth    -0.032  0.022  -0.003  0.022 
 
GDP per Capita × 10$%   -0.065*  -0.118*** -0.131*** 0.102*** 
 
Deficit     -0.047*** -0.053*** -0.005  -0.028* 
 
 
Demographic Variables 
Share Young    -0.410*** -0.411*** -0.457*** -0.414*** 
 
Share Old    -0.055  -0.159  -0.293*  -0.201 
 
Basic Education    0.019*  0.034***  0.035***  0.037*** 
 
 
Domestic Institutions Variables 
Left Cabinet    0.001  0.004***  0.004***  0.003*** 
 
Christian Democratic Cabinet  -0.004  0.000  0.001  -0.001 
 
Bargaining Coverage   0.021  0.008  0.017  0.011 
 
Employment Protection   -0.203  -0.383*  -0.421*** -0.322*** 
 
Constant     7.544***  10.764*** 8.110*  9.106*** 
N     53  46  46  46 
Rho     -.0180  -.204  -.260  -.166 
Adjusted R-Squared   0.966  0.984  0.986  0.981  
   
Notes:  Regression results are estimated using panel-corrected standard errors (not shown here); each regression model includes 
country and year dummies (not presented here); rho represents autocorrelation-coefficient of the error term, which ranges from 0 
to 1. 
* p<0.1, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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force with only basic education is positively and significantly correlated with spending on 
unemployment benefits in all three models, confirming the work of Walter (2010; 2017).  
Finally, the domestic institutions do not show surprising results. Left-wing parties are 
positively and significantly correlated with unemployment benefits in all three models as was 
expected based on Korpi and Palme (2003) and Allan and Scruggs (2004). Furthermore, the 
results might provide support for the existence of a trade-off between employment protection 
and unemployment benefits (Boeri et al. 2003; Rueda 2006). 
 
5.7 Sensitivity analyses 
 
To examine the robustness of its results, this study performs two sensitivity analyses, the results 
are shown in the supplementary tables 1 and 2. First, this study tests whether the insignificant 
results regarding the relationship between globalisation and expenditures on expanding welfare 
programmes (models 6 and 7 from table 4.1). Recall that based on the work of Burgoon (2001), 
Martin and Swank (2004), Van Vliet and Koster (2011), and to a lesser extend Rueda (2006) it 
was expected that globalisation is positively related to ALMP in general and training and 
relocation benefit in particular. From a methodological perspective, it might be argued that this 
can be explained by the relatively low number of cases included in this sample. To counter this 
potential critique this study excludes the demographic and domestic institutions variable from 
the regression estimation, which increase the number of observations to 415 for ALMP and 406 
for training and relocation benefits (compared to 174 and 173 respectively). Consequently, this 
estimation only controls for socio-economic developments. Nevertheless, the results are 
relatively similar. FDI is negatively and significantly correlated with both welfare programmes. 
Recall that FDI was initially only negatively and significantly correlated with ALMP (model 6 
table 4.1). Furthermore, the other globalisation measures are still insignificant.  
 Second, this study uses Wang and Caminada’s (2017) concentration rates to examine 
the robustness of the results presented in table 5.3. In this respect, this study aims to reduce 
possible criticism regarding its use of dummy variables. As shown in table 4.1, this study’s 
concentration indices on welfare benefits are relatively similar to Wang and Caminada’s (2017) 
concentration indices on social transfers in general. Therefore, the latter can act a proxy for 
concentration indices on unemployment benefits. Since Wang and Caminada’s (2017) 
concentration rates range from minus 1 (the poorest person gets all income) to 1 (the richest 
person gets all income) this study expects that interaction between globalisation and the target 
rate will be positive if the correlation between globalisation and unemployment benefits is  
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negative, implying that the higher the degree to which a programme is targeted towards the 
poor the weaker the effect of globalisation on unemployment benefits. Similarly, this study 
expects that the interaction between globalisation and the target rate will be negative if the 
correlation between globalisation and unemployment benefits is negative, indicating that the 
higher the degree to which a programme is targeted towards the poor the stronger the effect of 
globalisation on unemployment benefits. The findings presented in supplementary table 2 
provide are mixed. The results in model 1 are in line with the results reported in table 5.3. 
Contrastingly, the results of model 2 and 3 do not provide support for this study argumentation 
regarding the effect of targeting welfare towards low-income groups. Although these results 
should not be taken too lightly, it should be reminded that the analysis might suffer for the fact 
that the main explanatory variable was a proxy. Nevertheless, these results show that future 
research is desired, and these are presumably fare from the final words on the issue. 
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
There has been a long-lasting theoretical call for analysing the effect of globalisation on welfare 
state spending on a disaggregated level (Schulze and Ursprung 1999). Results of recent studies 
analysing welfare state expenditures at an aggregated level underline the relevance of this call 
(Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Mahler and Jesuit 2006; Wang et al. 2014; Castles 2009; 
Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 2011) This study answers to this theoretical call and argues 
that the impact of globalisation differs across welfare state programmes. The diverging impact 
of globalisation can be explained by the different outcomes of political conflict between the 
(potential) losers of globalisation and capital owners (Burgoon 2001). On the one hand, it is 
assumed that the (potential) losers of globalisation specifically demand increased spending on 
welfare programmes that directly answer to their short-term needs, like unemployment benefits, 
and ALMP. They perceive other programmes as less relevant, and thus express little demand 
for welfare expansion in this respect. Capital owners, on the other hand, are expected to oppose 
programmes that increase tax burdens, or that do not improve productivity, or both. Typical 
examples in this regard are, among others, unemployment benefits, health-care benefits, 
retirement benefits and housing support. 
 By combing the preferences of (potential) losers and capital owners, the study defined 
four ideal-type categories of welfare state programmes: stable programmes, eroding 
programmes, expanding programmes and erratic programmes. The political conflict underlying 
welfare state spending was expected to result in clear outcomes for three out of four categories 
(the status quo, expansion or retrenchment). This study analysed whether this is the case with 
regard to eroding and expanding programmes. However, the main focus of this study was to 
analyse the consequences of globalisation for erratic programmes, associated with both heavy 
demands from (potential) losers for expansion and strong opposition from capital owners 
correspondingly. In this regard, this study expected that the institutional structure of a welfare 
programme mediates the effect of globalisation on welfare state spending. Besides, it 
hypothesized that globalisation will result in relatively less spending on welfare state 
programmes that are targeted towards low-income groups. Resultingly, this study specifically 
addressed the following research question:   
 
Does a welfare programmes’ institutional structure, classified as rather targeted 
towards low-income groups or universal, mediates the impact of globalisation 
on welfare programmes that are associated with political conflict? 
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 To test whether this study’s hypotheses withstand an empirical analysis, this study 
included eight individual welfare state programmes and categorized them in the following way. 
Health-care benefits, retirement benefits, family benefits, housing spending and incapacity 
benefits were regarded as eroding programmes. Additionally, ALMP and training and 
relocation benefits were characterized as expanding programmes. Finally, unemployment 
benefits were classified as an erratic programme. Subsequently, this study used pooled time-
series cross-sectional regression to analyse the effect of globalisation on welfare state spending 
in fourteen OECD countries in the period from 1994 to 2012. In this, regard it relied on the 
most recent data available updating the work of Korpi and Palme (1998) Burgoon (2001) and 
Swank (2002). Additionally, this study contributes to the literature by using LIS data (2017) to 
calculate concentration indices for an individual programme. In this respect, it updates the work 
of Jesuit and Mahler (2006) and Wang and Caminada (2011, 2017).  
 With respect to the eroding programmes, this study’s results showed that there is some 
support that globalisation is negatively impacting welfare state spending. However, most 
estimated coefficients show an insignificant effect. This might be explained by a lack of useful 
data for some of the key variables, resulting in the relatively low number of cases included in 
this study. Nevertheless, globalisation has a significant and negative effect on both housing-
support and incapacity benefits, which in in line with the general claim that globalisation 
negatively impacts government spending (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Busemeyer 2008). 
Thereby, the results of this study at least partly confirm Burgoon’s (2001) claim that 
globalisation will result in retrenchment on welfare state programmes associated with low 
demands from (potential) losers of globalisation and strong opposition from capital owners. 
The former claim can also be confirmed by the results obtained related to the share of 
individuals with only basic education. Namely, this variable is insignificant for every program, 
suggesting that the part of lower-educated in the labour force does not significantly impact the 
spending on these programmes. This indicates that lower-educated individuals, presumably the 
(potential) losers of globalisation, do not demand increased welfare state spending for these 
programmes. Consequently, the results provide support for this study’s first hypothesis that 
globalisation will result in the retrenchment of welfare state programmes associated with low 
demands for welfare compensation from (potential) losers and high opposition from capital 
owners. 
 A notable exception to the above described result are health-care benefits. Both FDI 
flows and low wage imports have a significant and positive effect on spending on health-care 
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benefits. Although these results contradict with the study’s expectation, Swank’s (2001, 113-4) 
analysis of the effect of globalisation on health care spending shows fairly similar results.1 The 
unexpected relation between globalisation and health-care benefits might be explained by the 
universal character of the latter. Health-care benefits generally do not differ per income level 
or employment status. Consequently, it can be argued that demands to expand health-care 
benefits are not only expressed by a small share of the electorate (the (potential) losers of 
globalisation), but rather by a far more substantial part of the electorate (the total population). 
In this respect, Pierson’s (1996, 146) argument, that some welfare programmes create dense 
interest groups that will prevent retrenchment, might be at least correct in the case of health-
care benefits. Yet, the above cannot explain the direct link between globalisation and health-
care benefits. This study is not aware of literature analysing this link, making it a interesting 
subject for furture research.  
  Turning to the expanding programmes, the results of this study showed that there is no 
positive relationship between globalisation and ALMP and job training and relocation benefits. 
Thereby, the results do not support the study’s second hypothesis that globalisation will result 
in increased spending for welfare state programmes associated with high demands for 
compensation from (potential) losers and support from capital owners. Additionally, this results 
contrast with results provided by Swank and Martin (2001, 912) and Van Vliet and Koster 
(2011, 230). Yet, it is noteworthy that Rueda’s (2006, 401) results already showed that the 
effect of globalisation on ALMP is ambiguous. His analysis indicated that whereas trade 
openness has a significant and positive effect on the level of ALMP spending, financial 
openness was negatively correlated to ALMP expenditures. Given the ambiguous results 
regarding the effect of globalisation on ALMP, further research is needed to understand this 
relationship. 
Again, it can be argued that the results of this study suffer from a relevantly small sample 
size. This claim might be supported by the fact that all control variables were insignificant, with 
the exception of the significant and negative correlation between the level of deficit and ALMP. 
However, when the analyses in this study only included the five socio-economic variables in 
the regression estimation (which increased the number of observations to 403), all three 
                                                        
1 In his analysis Swank (2001, 112-4) analyses the relation between health-benefits expenditures and five 
measures of capital mobility (capital liberalization, total capital flows, FDI, capital markets and interest rate 
differentials) and one measure of trade openness (real imports plus real exports as a percentage of GDP). His 
results show that trade is significantly and positively correlated to health-care benefit expenditure in his all 
country sample. Besides, international capital flows and FDI have a significant and positive effect on health-care 
benefits in ‘conservative welfare states’, which include Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy. With the 
exception of Belgium, all these countries are included in this study.  
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globalisation measures were still negatively correlated with both ALMP and training and 
relocation benefits (see supplementary table 1).2  
 Finally and most importantly, the results of this study show that the institutional 
structure of welfare programmes mediates the effect of globalisation on programmes that are 
associated with political conflict, confirming the third hypothesis. In this regard, this study is 
the first to empirically demonstrate the mediating effects of a welfare programme’s institutional 
structure. Globalisation, when measured as trade openness or FDI flows, is significantly 
associated with lower unemployment benefit expenditures for programmes that are targeted 
towards low-income groups. This finding is line with other studies analysing the potential trade-
off between targeting and redistribution in general (Korpi and Palme 1998; Moene and 
Wallerstein 2001; Bergh 2004). Additionally, updated relatively classic analyses (Rotherstein 
1998; Swank 2002), arguing that the institutional structure of a welfare state is an essential 
determinant in explaining the effect of globalisation on the welfare state as a whole (Swank 
2002, 56). 
 However, this study’s analysis has some limitations. First, this study’s methodological 
approach has some drawback. First, it uses dummy variables to examine the effect of the 
institutional structure of unemployment programmes on the relationship between globalisation 
and unemployment spending. Although this allows for a clear-cut comparison between 
unemployment benefit programmes that are targeted towards the poor and their universal 
counterparts, the usage of dummy variables is accompanied with a loss of data richness. 
Additionally, the cut-off value at which dummy variables are generated is generally somewhat 
arbitrary. Consequently, this study encourages future research to test its claims and continues 
to analyse how a welfare programme’s institutional structure is related to its size. LIS data 
(2017) allow for such detailed analyses. Second, even though this study relies on the most recent 
data available, its sample size is relatively small due to data limitations. This might have 
affected this study’s analysis. An important advantage for future research is the increasing 
availability of data, allowing for more in-depth analyses on the mediating effect of welfare 
programmes’ institutional structure.  
Additionally, this study assumed that the institutional structure of welfare programmes 
only matters for erratic programmes. Consequently, this study solely focussed on 
                                                        
2 Note that increasing the sample size by excluding demographic and domestic institutions related control 
variables increase the number of significant control variables. In this regard, the unemployment rate is in both 
cases positive and significant. Furthermore, GDP per capita is significantly and negatively associated with 
ALMP.  
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unemployment benefits since this is the only welfare state programme that is characterized as 
erratic. Although this study argues that this choice is theoretically justified, future research is 
needed to test whether it is possible that welfare state programme’s institutional structure is 
also relevant in relation to other programmes. Moreover, it would be interesting to test whether 
the preferences of the (potential) losers of globalisation and capital owners indeed vary per 
welfare programme. Studies focussing on the micro-foundations of policy preferences in the 
light of globalisation, as Scheve and Slaughter (2004), Rhem (2009) and Walter (2010;2017), 
might inspire other researchers to take up this challenge.  
 Nevertheless, this study’s findings have some important implicants for governments 
trying to compensate their citizens from the negative effects of globalisation. Some scholars 
(Ghysels and Van Lancker 2011; Lundvall and Lorenz 2012; Krings 2014) argue that 
governments, when confronted with pressures to reduce spending, can combine a genours 
welfare state for those in need and at the same time cut spending by target their welfare 
programmes towards low-income groups. This study showed that this might have unforeseen 
consequences. Targeting welfare programmes might reduce electoral support for redistribution 
and even hollows out the welfare state. Governments should be aware of this possibility before 
they make potential far-reaching policy choices.  
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Supplementary Tables 
 
 
 
 
Supplem entary table 1 – Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard 
errors of expenditures on ALMP and job training and relocation benefits 
 
                ALMP          Job Training 
    and Relocation 
                                                                       (1)                      (2) 
 
Globalisation Variables   
Trade Openness    0.000     -0.001 
FDI Flows    -0.000     -0.000 
Low Wage Imports   -0.006***    -0.006*** 
 
Socio-Economic Variables     
Deindustrialisation   -0.114     0.006 
Unemployment    0.010*     0.013*** 
GDP per Capita ×10$%   -0.011***    -0.005 
Economic Growth   -0.001     -0.005 
Deficit     -0.003     0.002 
 
Constant    0.510***    0.214 
N     415     406 
Rho     .650     .680 
Adjusted R-squared   0.799     0.696 
 
 
Notes:  Regression results are estimated using panel-corrected standard errors (not shown here); each regression model 
includes country and year dummies (not presented here); rho represents autocorrelation-coefficient of the error term, which 
ranges from 0 to 1. 
* p<0.1, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Supplem entary table 2 – Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard 
errors of expenditures on unem ployment benefits 
 
 
 
       Unemployment benefits 
(1)                  (2)                    (3) 
 
Globalisation Variables 
Target Rate    -0.093   -0.016   -0.135 
 
Trade     -0.006    
Target Rate x Trade      0.032*   
 
FDI        -0.007  
Targeted Towards Poor x FDI     -0.077***  
 
Low Wage Imports         0.037* 
Target Rate x Low Wage Imports        0.122*** 
 
 
Socio-Economic Variables 
Deindustrializat ion   6.825   12.819*   4.161 
Unemployment    0.006   0.031   -0.005  
GDP per Capita ×10$%   -0.117*   -0.115***  -0.109*** 
Economic Growth   0.008   -0.007   0.077 
Deficit     -0.038   -0.019   -0.048*** 
 
 
Demographic Variables 
Young     -0.442***  -0.453***  -0.419*** 
Old     -0.092   -0.225*   -0.146* 
Basic Education    0.033***  0.030***  0.038*** 
 
 
Domestic Institutions Variables 
Left Cabinet    0.003***  0.004***  0.003*** 
Christian Democratic Cabinet  -0.003   0.002   -0.003 
Bargaining Coverage   0.023***  0.019***  0.020 
Employment Protection   -0.203*   -0.344***  -0.214*** 
 
 
Constant    9.699***  7.481*   10.710*** 
N     46   46   46 
Rho     -.180   -.117   -.275 
Adjusted R-Squared   0.982   0.981   0.986 
 
Notes:  Regression results are estimated using panel-corrected standard errors (not shown here); each regression model 
includes country and year dummies (not presented here); rho represents autocorrelation-coefficient of the error term, which 
ranges from 0 to 1. 
* p<0.1, * p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
